Zürcher Nachrichten - Global finance in few hands

EUR -
AED 4.240081
AFN 75.628368
ALL 93.094431
AMD 422.645236
AOA 1059.875198
ARS 1721.451062
AUD 1.632666
AWG 2.081073
AZN 1.960779
BAM 1.957382
BBD 2.325079
BDT 142.166128
BHD 0.435356
BIF 3451.219115
BMD 1.154548
BND 1.477081
BOB 13.616122
BRL 5.950424
BSD 1.154433
BTN 109.991846
BWP 15.540425
BYN 3.447757
BYR 22629.142525
BZD 2.321797
CAD 1.607587
CDF 2626.597054
CHF 0.936656
CLF 0.026764
CLP 1053.386652
CNY 7.787777
CNH 7.78805
COP 3623.583811
CRC 524.423831
CUC 1.154548
CUP 30.595524
CVE 110.355143
CZK 24.252671
DJF 205.577926
DKK 7.475687
DOP 67.403891
DZD 153.435674
EGP 57.977825
ERN 17.318221
ETB 186.734934
FJD 2.552707
FKP 0.854422
GBP 0.853529
GEL 3.019111
GGP 0.854422
GHS 13.217797
GIP 0.854422
GMD 84.858232
GNF 10141.283867
GTQ 8.808042
GYD 241.567323
HKD 9.059716
HNL 30.942739
HRK 7.535736
HTG 151.000729
HUF 364.102928
IDR 20602.91063
ILS 3.450656
IMP 0.854422
INR 110.101227
IQD 1512.309126
IRR 1587157.25621
ISK 141.801407
JEP 0.854422
JMD 182.759286
JOD 0.818586
JPY 183.670703
KES 149.294395
KGS 100.965522
KHR 4674.737561
KMF 492.992624
KRW 1636.329207
KWD 0.356802
KYD 0.962069
KZT 537.51976
LAK 26047.276614
LBP 103379.244923
LKR 385.891872
LRD 209.531155
LSL 18.653014
LTL 3.409081
LVL 0.698374
LYD 7.363014
MAD 10.723059
MDL 20.012
MGA 4968.058138
MKD 61.579768
MMK 2424.478032
MNT 4152.523128
MOP 9.331022
MRU 46.142691
MUR 54.34422
MVR 17.837556
MWK 2001.835191
MXN 19.697421
MYR 4.717023
MZN 73.196549
NAD 18.653014
NGN 1572.829598
NIO 42.484703
NOK 10.940093
NPR 175.983703
NZD 1.967517
OMR 0.443929
PAB 1.154443
PEN 3.901587
PGK 5.106171
PHP 70.691785
PKR 320.66916
PLN 4.304272
PYG 6888.626947
QAR 4.208838
RON 5.240513
RSD 117.333228
RUB 95.656399
RWF 1700.459557
SAR 4.329967
SBD 9.311477
SCR 15.843758
SDG 693.313001
SEK 10.996308
SGD 1.476692
SLE 28.284795
SOS 659.727467
SRD 43.810462
STD 23896.814398
STN 24.519817
SVC 10.101251
SZL 18.634899
THB 38.167052
TJS 10.678523
TMT 4.052464
TND 3.38974
TRY 55.124598
TTD 7.829395
TWD 37.197283
TZS 3053.783117
UAH 51.582842
UGX 4282.461019
USD 1.154548
UYU 46.467957
UZS 13804.275968
VES 877.76273
VND 30081.173158
VUV 136.747913
WST 3.151905
XAF 656.481872
XAG 0.017457
XAU 0.000262
XCD 3.120224
XCG 2.080581
XDR 0.816156
XOF 656.493254
XPF 119.331742
YER 273.877749
ZAR 18.627802
ZMK 10392.318525
ZMW 21.726747
ZWL 371.764013
  • RBGPF

    2.2800

    72.16

    +3.16%

  • RYCEF

    -0.0200

    20.55

    -0.1%

  • BCE

    -0.2500

    23.11

    -1.08%

  • RELX

    -0.6600

    34.71

    -1.9%

  • NGG

    0.9300

    81.21

    +1.15%

  • RIO

    1.3000

    102.3

    +1.27%

  • CMSD

    -0.0800

    21.55

    -0.37%

  • GSK

    -0.6300

    50.28

    -1.25%

  • AZN

    -0.2600

    158.46

    -0.16%

  • BCC

    -0.8650

    84.625

    -1.02%

  • VOD

    0.1400

    16.04

    +0.87%

  • BP

    -0.5050

    42.66

    -1.18%

  • JRI

    -0.0100

    12.71

    -0.08%

  • BTI

    -0.1750

    56.635

    -0.31%

  • CMSC

    -0.1300

    21.44

    -0.61%


Global finance in few hands




More than fifteen years after the collapse of the housing bubble unleashed the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the institutions at the heart of the disaster have not only survived but thrived. The implosion exposed how private credit rating agencies stamped complex mortgage products as ultra‑safe, fuelling a boom that came crashing down. Yet those agencies continue to dominate the ratings business, while a handful of enormous asset managers exert unprecedented influence over companies and markets. This concentration of power raises profound questions about who ultimately controls the flow of money and risk in the global economy.

How rating agencies misjudged risk and kept their grip
Credit rating agencies are supposed to act as impartial referees that assess the probability that borrowers – whether governments, corporations or securitized vehicles – will repay their debts. During the lead‑up to the 2008 crisis, however, the leading agencies awarded top‑tier grades to complex mortgage‑backed securities that were anything but safe. Critics later concluded that the agencies used flawed models and overlooked the possibility of falling house prices. When the housing market turned, the same agencies slashed their ratings; one of them downgraded 83 percent of the mortgage securities it had deemed AAA the previous year.

The scandal exposed structural conflicts in the "issuer‑pays" business model: debt issuers pay for their own ratings, creating incentives to please clients rather than warn investors. Regulators in the United States and Europe imposed fines and enacted reforms, but the essential model remained. Today the three dominant agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – still control roughly 95 percent of the global ratings market. Their judgments affect everything from municipal bond yields to the interest rates on sovereign debt. Critics argue that private profit‑seeking companies continue to act as quasi‑regulators, effectively passing judgement on whether countries and corporations are worthy of investment.

Despite their role in the crisis, the agencies have prospered. One ratings firm reported 2025 revenue of roughly $7.7 billion, up 9 percent from the previous year, and forecast higher earnings and margins in 2026. Its credit‑rating division enjoyed a double‑digit revenue jump thanks to a surge of debt issuance by technology giants investing in artificial‑intelligence infrastructure. Investors have rewarded this growth; another agency’s share price hit record levels last year, and its executives reassured investors that the proprietary data underpinning its ratings provides an enduring competitive moat. Thus the firms that helped inflate the housing bubble continue to generate extraordinary profits by rating ever more complex instruments.

The rise of the “Big Three” asset managers
While rating agencies wield soft power through their opinions, a handful of U.S. asset managers now hold hard power over corporations. A decades‑long shift from actively managed funds to index‑tracking products has channelled trillions of dollars into a few firms. Three companies – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – collectively manage more than $30 trillion in assets and dominate roughly three‑quarters of the U.S. equity exchange‑traded fund market. They are the largest shareholder in about 88 percent of S&P 500 companies and cast about one‑quarter of the votes at shareholder meetings for those firms. Such concentration is unprecedented in capital markets and allows these managers to influence corporate strategies, executive pay and mergers.

Each firm followed a different path to dominance. BlackRock became the world’s largest asset manager through acquisitions; its 2009 purchase of Barclays Global Investors and its iShares ETFs catapulted the firm into market leadership. By the end of 2025 it oversaw about $14 trillion, with record inflows and a growing presence in private credit and infrastructure. Vanguard, organized as a mutual company owned by its investors, built a reputation for ultra‑low fees and tax efficiency; its funds now hold around $10 – 12 trillion. State Street pioneered the exchange‑traded fund in the early 1990s; although it manages fewer assets than its two rivals, its funds remain crucial for short‑term traders.

The influence of these firms extends beyond the United States. Europe’s market share of its own asset management industry has been shrinking as U.S. firms increase their footprint. A 2026 policy brief notes that BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street oversee about $26 trillion globally and are rapidly overtaking European competitors. U.S. asset managers have increased their share of the European market from about 40 percent in 2021 to an estimated 47 percent in 2026. European policymakers worry that the dominance of foreign managers could weaken the continent’s ambitions to align investments with environmental and social goals.

Hidden leverage and systemic risk
The concentration of financial power is not limited to ratings and asset management. Hedge funds, which operate largely in the shadows, have dramatically increased their borrowing. Recent data from the U.S. Office of Financial Research show that hedge fund borrowing reached about $7 trillion in late 2025 – a 160 percent increase since 2018. Repo financing and prime-brokerage lending each account for roughly $3 trillion of this total. Many funds use leverage ratios of 50:1 or even 100:1, meaning a small drop in asset values could wipe out their capital and threaten lenders. Analysts compare the situation to the buildup before the 1998 collapse of Long‑Term Capital Management, when hidden leverage and crowded trades required a Federal Reserve‑led rescue to prevent contagion. If rates rise or market volatility surges, today’s highly leveraged funds could trigger wider instability, forcing banks and central banks to intervene.

Public anger and calls for accountability
Outside boardrooms, public frustration over the perceived impunity of financial elites remains intense. Online comments reacting to recent reporting on rating agencies and asset managers reveal recurring themes. Many people argue that those who misrated mortgage securities and brought the global economy to its knees should have faced jail time rather than fines. Others ask who supervises the raters themselves and whether profit‑driven firms should hold so much sway over credit and investment decisions. There is widespread skepticism that financial crimes are ever punished and resentment that the same individuals and institutions continue to profit from the system they mismanaged. Some commenters see the complexity of modern finance as a deliberate obfuscation designed to enrich insiders at the expense of ordinary savers. Others lament that greed has been elevated to a virtue while accurate risk assessment, a vital public good, is outsourced to organisations whose incentives are misaligned.

Conclusion: Concentration and reform
The global financial system is far more concentrated today than it was on the eve of the last crisis. Three private ratings firms still dominate the assessment of credit risk despite their failure to foresee the housing crash and their conflicts of interest. Three asset managers hold sway over trillions of dollars, control huge voting stakes in the world’s biggest companies, and are expanding into private markets and public policy debates. Hedge funds borrow on a scale that could amplify market stress and force public rescues. Taken together, these trends raise uncomfortable questions about accountability, transparency and the balance of power in global finance.

Regulators in the United States and Europe have taken steps to increase oversight, but deeper reforms may be necessary. Possible measures include diversifying the ratings industry, breaking up overly dominant players, shifting away from the issuer‑pays model, and strengthening public or nonprofit alternatives. Policymakers could also encourage the growth of domestic asset managers in regions like Europe to reduce reliance on foreign firms and align investment flows with local goals. And to address systemic risk, regulators need better visibility into hedge-fund leverage and the ability to enforce limits. The financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of unchecked risk and concentrated power. The fact that the key players have emerged richer and more powerful underscores the need for vigilance and reform to prevent history from repeating itself.