Zürcher Nachrichten - Russia’s dollar pivot

EUR -
AED 4.177871
AFN 72.80738
ALL 92.182487
AMD 413.339148
ANG 2.036739
AOA 1044.327004
ARS 1734.581912
AUD 1.618871
AWG 2.0477
AZN 1.928636
BAM 1.956464
BBD 2.291528
BDT 140.07875
BGN 1.915101
BHD 0.428849
BIF 3408.961307
BMD 1.137611
BND 1.454257
BOB 13.930909
BRL 5.934653
BSD 1.137761
BTN 109.140463
BWP 15.555482
BYN 3.44392
BYR 22297.173895
BZD 2.288106
CAD 1.612063
CDF 2662.009743
CHF 0.94585
CLF 0.027869
CLP 1100.433526
CNY 7.637067
CNH 7.635167
COP 3833.032082
CRC 516.709349
CUC 1.137611
CUP 27.305463
CVE 110.304358
CZK 24.37667
DJF 202.176084
DKK 7.475571
DOP 67.735955
DZD 152.253445
EGP 59.266572
ERN 17.064164
ETB 185.398838
FJD 2.543362
FKP 0.858687
GBP 0.857582
GEL 2.974854
GGP 0.858687
GHS 13.236665
GIP 0.858687
GMD 83.609373
GNF 10005.482122
GTQ 8.689024
GYD 238.053894
HKD 8.924637
HNL 30.540629
HRK 7.534515
HTG 148.897055
HUF 366.91877
IDR 20519.088038
ILS 3.503384
IMP 0.858687
INR 109.175098
IQD 1490.318663
IRR 1564030.148208
ISK 136.991576
JEP 0.858687
JMD 180.101096
JOD 0.806586
JPY 178.89671
KES 147.581934
KGS 99.48237
KHR 4617.627329
KMF 492.585757
KPW 1023.850183
KRW 1546.399926
KWD 0.35126
KYD 0.948134
KZT 500.31412
LAK 25526.996138
LBP 101880.004207
LKR 376.574366
LRD 195.678961
LSL 18.695606
LTL 3.35907
LVL 0.68813
LYD 7.277597
MAD 10.956009
MDL 20.114089
MGA 4990.758826
MKD 61.590894
MMK 2388.795803
MNT 4090.929754
MOP 9.19284
MRU 45.575861
MUR 54.00265
MVR 17.576362
MWK 1972.795246
MXN 20.312054
MYR 4.643391
MZN 72.704379
NAD 18.695606
NGN 1509.655352
NIO 41.86457
NOK 10.847757
NPR 174.629915
NZD 2.005113
OMR 0.437407
PAB 1.137701
PEN 3.865981
PGK 5.146836
PHP 71.061437
PKR 315.226376
PLN 4.368335
PYG 6682.266833
QAR 4.146907
RON 5.278285
RSD 117.528802
RUB 96.130204
RWF 1679.791987
SAR 4.272768
SBD 9.10147
SCR 15.782527
SDG 684.270165
SEK 11.316333
SGD 1.452735
SHP 0.858898
SLE 28.042309
SLL 23855.122804
SOS 650.26346
SRD 42.872012
STD 23546.249072
STN 24.50993
SVC 9.954464
SYP 14791.21738
SZL 18.690916
THB 38.184476
TJS 10.495199
TMT 3.993014
TND 3.369043
TOP 2.739094
TRY 55.720974
TTD 7.721823
TWD 36.143607
TZS 2997.608165
UAH 51.052419
UGX 4453.589093
USD 1.137611
UYU 45.606273
UZS 13441.796191
VES 969.73532
VND 29548.87466
VUV 134.011815
WST 3.123559
XAF 655.957
XAG 0.018567
XAU 0.000275080591
XCD 3.07445
XCG 2.050414
XDR 0.80435
XOF 655.957
XPF 119.331742
YER 269.215231
ZAR 18.651931
ZMK 10239.86412
ZMW 22.156808
ZWL 366.31025
SSP 6498.706883
MXV 2.300288
  • RBGPF

    -1.5200

    64.47

    -2.36%

  • CMSC

    0.0000

    20.4

    0%

  • NGG

    -0.2500

    75.24

    -0.33%

  • BTI

    0.4200

    56.05

    +0.75%

  • RELX

    -0.4500

    33.07

    -1.36%

  • GSK

    0.4600

    49.7

    +0.93%

  • BCE

    -0.4100

    20.56

    -1.99%

  • RIO

    -0.1500

    94.41

    -0.16%

  • BP

    0.2800

    44.43

    +0.63%

  • AZN

    -0.4300

    166.15

    -0.26%

  • RYCEF

    -0.0400

    19.56

    -0.2%

  • BCC

    -0.5500

    76.59

    -0.72%

  • JRI

    -0.2500

    10.77

    -2.32%

  • CMSD

    -0.0300

    20.27

    -0.15%

  • VOD

    -0.0400

    16.58

    -0.24%


Russia’s dollar pivot




For years, Moscow positioned itself as the standard‑bearer of de‑dollarization. After Western sanctions were imposed in 2022, the Kremlin accelerated efforts to settle trade in local currencies, expanded gold reserves and championed alternative payment systems within the bloc of major emerging economies known as BRICS. Senior officials boasted that the age of the greenback was ending, and state media presented the shift as a moral stand against Western financial hegemony.

That narrative now faces an extraordinary test. According to an internal government memorandum circulated among senior officials early this year and reported by multiple media outlets, Russia is exploring a broad economic rapprochement with the United States in return for sanctions relief and progress on a settlement in Ukraine. The document lists seven areas of potential cooperation, from fossil fuels and natural gas to offshore oil exploration and strategic minerals. The most striking element is Moscow’s readiness to re‑enter the dollar settlement system—a reversal of the policy that has underpinned its eastward economic pivot.

De‑dollarization and the BRICS currency dream
Russia’s push to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar has been most visible in its trade with China. By mid‑2023, President Vladimir Putin told a St Petersburg business forum that more than four‑fifths of bilateral trade was being settled in rubles and yuan, noting that reliance on the dollar exposed both sides to risks and costs. The trend accelerated: at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said around 92 percent of trade settlement between Russia and China was being conducted in the two countries’ currencies. Bilateral trade volumes reached $240 billion in 2023, up sharply from the previous year, and the share of deals using local currencies climbed from a quarter in 2021 to two‑thirds in 2023.

These shifts were part of a broader agenda within BRICS. At the bloc’s summit in Kazan in October 2024, leaders discussed the idea of creating a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their national currencies. On stage, Mr Putin held up a prototype banknote meant to symbolise a BRICS currency. Yet he struck a conciliatory note, stressing that the goal was not to “refuse or fight the dollar” but to prevent its “weaponization” by developing mechanisms for local‑currency trade. Officials from other member states expressed similar caution. The bloc’s New Development Bank made clear there was “no suggestion right now” of launching a new currency.

Within BRICS, the shift away from the dollar has been uneven but significant. Roughly 60–67 percent of intra‑BRICS trade is now estimated to be settled in local currencies, according to government data. Russia’s bilateral trade with China and India is said to be 90–95 percent denominated in rubles, yuan and rupees. However, the dollar still accounts for about 88–89 percent of global foreign exchange transactions and remains the dominant currency for energy and commodity trading. Energy contracts are largely priced in dollars, and global capital markets continue to operate primarily in the U.S. currency.

A leaked memo and a potential U.S. deal
Against this backdrop, the leaked Kremlin memorandum marks a dramatic change of tone. The document proposes an “energy dominance” partnership in which the United States and Russia would transition from rivals to partners, focusing on joint investments in liquefied natural gas, offshore drilling and the development of critical minerals such as palladium and nickel. In exchange for a peace framework in Ukraine and the easing of sanctions, Moscow would re‑open its economy to American firms and return to dollar‑denominated trade. The memo describes this shift as an economic realignment rather than a symbolic gesture, arguing that reintegration into the dollar system would expand Russia’s access to global liquidity, lower transaction costs and stabilise its currency markets.

Such a pivot would reverse years of painstaking efforts to insulate Russia from U.S. financial pressure. Since 2022, nearly 90 percent of Russia’s trade with China and India has been settled in national currencies, and the share of local‑currency settlement across BRICS has climbed steadily. Russia’s removal from the SWIFT financial messaging system forced banks to adopt alternative channels. Returning to the dollar would restore access to deep capital markets but would also reintroduce exposure to potential U.S. sanctions and financial surveillance.

Why Moscow might turn back
Analysts point to several reasons why the Kremlin might consider embracing the dollar once more. First, the de‑dollarization drive has increased Russia’s dependence on China. Using the yuan binds Moscow to a partner whose economic clout far exceeds its own, giving Beijing significant leverage. The leaked memo implicitly acknowledges this imbalance by proposing diversification through renewed engagement with the United States. Second, the dollar’s dominance in global trade and finance remains overwhelming. According to central bank data, the greenback makes up the majority of foreign exchange reserves and still facilitates most energy transactions. Re‑entering dollar‑based systems would improve liquidity for Russian businesses and help stabilise the ruble, which has seen volatile swings against the U.S. currency.

A return to dollar settlements could also serve as a bargaining chip. Moscow may hope to leverage its willingness to rejoin the U.S. financial architecture to secure sanctions relief and concessions on Ukraine. In this interpretation, the memo is less a repudiation of BRICS than a pragmatic negotiation tactic. It signals openness to compromise without committing to immediate policy changes. The Kremlin has not publicly confirmed the document’s authenticity, and officials have said that any agreement would depend on complex diplomatic alignments and legislative approval in Washington.

Strains on BRICS and relations with Beijing
Even the suggestion of a dollar comeback has unsettled other BRICS members. China has invested heavily in internationalising the yuan, and India has expanded rupee settlements. A Russian about‑face would slow the momentum behind alternative payment systems and cast doubt on proposals like BRICS Pay. It could also introduce friction within the bloc: Brazil, South Africa and Saudi Arabia have backed gradual de‑dollarization as a means of strengthening economic sovereignty. For them, Russia’s shift might look like a betrayal of a shared agenda.

The move could have significant geopolitical consequences for Russia’s relationship with China. Beijing has been Moscow’s lifeline since the invasion of Ukraine, purchasing discounted oil and gas and providing access to technology. In return, Moscow has become more reliant on Chinese investment and currency channels. A pivot toward the dollar risks antagonising China and weakening a partnership that both sides describe as a “no‑limits” friendship. Some observers suggest that the Kremlin is betting it can balance ties with Washington and Beijing or at least extract concessions from both.

An uncertain path ahead
For now, Russia remains deeply integrated into the Chinese economic sphere. Trade in local currencies continues to expand, and the BRICS countries have not abandoned the idea of enhancing payment mechanisms independent of the U.S. dollar. The leaked memo is a reminder that geopolitical strategies are shaped as much by pragmatism as by ideology. Moscow’s de‑dollarization campaign has always been about hedging against Western pressure rather than declaring a clean break. If sanctions were lifted and economic incentives aligned, a return to the dollar would be less ideological surrender than tactical adjustment.

Still, the implications are profound. Should Russia re‑enter dollar‑based trade, it would signal that even a leading advocate of alternative currencies sees advantages in the existing system. It would test the cohesion of BRICS and force Beijing to reassess the balance of power within the partnership. Above all, it underscores the resilience of the greenback: despite repeated predictions of its decline, the U.S. dollar remains the anchor of global finance, and even those who challenge it may find themselves drawn back into its orbit.